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1. INTRODUCTION. 
According to the 2016 report on fiscal federalism (Blöchliger and Kim, 2016), the OECD area 
has become more decentralized over the last two decades, as judged from the expenditure and 
revenue shares of the sub-national governments (SNGs). But when compared to the period of 
1970-1995, the  intensity and scope of the process of devolution, on average, appears to have  
lost its impetus in the recent past. However, this general tendency masks divergent institutional 
changes whereby the SNG revenue  and expenditure share increased in   federal countries such 
as Spain,  Canada, Germany and Belgium and declined in some unitary countries (e.g. Norway 
and the Netherlands) since 1995.  
Simultaneously, ongoing economic, financial and cultural globalisation has  challenged policy 
makers to boost the competitiveness of their national economies. And since achieving a more 
efficient allocation of resources was a major economic argument for devolution, fiscal 
decentralisation has become instrumental in coping with this new international environment 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). Along this line of thought the Central  European transition 
economies were already urged in the 1990s  to take substantial steps towards decentralization 
in view of the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargement (Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer, 2009). 
Decentralized governments will- according to the early proponents of fiscal federalism 
(Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972)- deliver an  efficient allocation of resources that is  tailored to the 
heterogeneous preferences of their citizens, mobilise unused productive  capacities and promote 
inter-jurisdictional  competition. The second generation fiscal federalism theory (Qian and 
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Weingast,1997; Weingast, 2009) complemented this optimistic view of decentralisation by 
specifying the institutional characteristics of  the “market preserving federalism” which are 
necessary for the implementation of the predicted efficient outcomes. 
Although in theory efficiency and equity can go hand in hand when decentralisation results in 
the productive use of idle  resources,  serious doubts have been raised regarding the distributive 
aspects  of fiscal federalism. Musgrave (1959)  pointed out that the redistributive function 
should appropriately be assigned to the central government. Pre-existing regional imbalances  
could indeed be aggravated by the process of devolution (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003) 
and risk being  inadequately dealt with by a central government that is devoid of its  distributive 
capacities as a result of fiscal decentralisation. Empirical studies on the link between fiscal 
decentralisation and regional disparities lead to divergent results depending on the level of 
development in the countries examined. In developing countries, that lack well-established, 
adequate institutions, fiscal decentralisation does not promote regional equalisation, whereas in  
high-income countries devolution apparently tends to narrow regional disparities of GDP per 
capita (Lesmann, 2012; Rodriguez-Pose  and Ezcurra, 2010).  
In the empirical studies referred to, fiscal decentralization is  commonly measured by the sub-
national share of government expenditure or revenue. The approach  followed in this paper 
differs from previous research in the measurement of fiscal autonomy, drawing from the  OECD  
classification of sub-national tax revenue according to the discretionary tax power SNGs can 
exert. Additionally, attention is given to the potential equalising impact of transport 
infrastructure investment, irrespective of whether it is financed by the central government or by 
the SNGs. 
The main research questions are: 
 To what extent does sub-national  tax autonomy contribute to a reduction of regional 
disparities in the framework of fiscal decentralization? 
 Does transport infrastructure investment  play a complementary  role with respect to tax 
autonomy or does it rather act as its substitute for narrowing regional disparities? 
 Do other sub-national  expenditure categories such as education and economic affairs 
have an equalising role? 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The literature and empirical  research on 
the subject will be briefly summarised in the next section. The  data and the specification and 
estimation method of the basic model will then be given. The empirical results will follow.  The 
final section summarises the main conclusions. 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  AND RELATED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH  
2.1 Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Disparities: Theoretical Arguments. 
The academic  interest  in the long-term  convergence of countries and regions began in the  
beginning of the 1990s  with several seminal papers that originated in the neoclassical growth 
theory (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). In this approach, the existence of long-
term regional convergence within a country  could be tested  econometrically in a rigorous way, 
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implying that the dispersion of regional GDP per capita would decrease over time.  Interregional 
mobility of capital and labour would, in this view, accelerate the speed of convergence. The 
underlying neoclassical growth model assumed, however, that all regions within a country 
where convergence applies, would  converge to the same steady state, irrespective of their 
different structural characteristics. This assumption is apparently  far from reality. The  
introduction of conditional instead of  absolute convergence, was therefore a logical  extension 
of the original convergence model, allowing the regions to tend to their respective steady state. 
The latter would be determined by specific regional features such as the existing industrial 
specialisation, the regional labour market and infrastructure    characteristics (Martin and 
Sunley, 1998). 
The conditional nature of the regional growth process  relates in particular  to the institutional 
framework of the regional economy, including the degree of political decentralization. 
Democratically elected regional governments that are to some extent autonomous in 
determining their tax revenue and the level and structure of expenditure will have strong 
incentives to tailor their programmes to the preferences of their electorate in view of their re-
election. This is  according to the predictions of the “second generation  fiscal federalism” 
(Weingast, 1995,2014; Qian and Weingast, 1997; Ezcurra  and Pascual, 2008). Fiscal 
decentralisation, installing tax and expenditure autonomy, will induce regional governments to 
compete for private investment by granting tax cuts (Hines, 1996). They may also be inclined 
to make regional labour markets more flexible and to invest in productive  infrastructure 
(Kappeler et al., 2013).   In this way, less developed regions can successfully  compete with 
their richer counterparts, thus reducing interregional  income differences. 
However, Rodriguez-Pose  and Ezcurra (2010)  point to the conditioning role of the economic 
environment in which decentralisation operates. The virtuous effects of fiscal decentralisation 
and inter-jurisdictional competition on regional disparities may be valid in developed countries 
with well-established institutions and relatively modest existing regional economic inequality. 
Tanzi (1996) questions the equalising effect of decentralisation in developing countries because 
of coordination issues between the central and local governments and of the risk of corruption 
of the local administration that lacks experience and professionalism. Kyriacou  et al. (2015) 
investigate the role of government quality as an important factor  that differentiates the potential 
impact of fiscal decentralization on regional inequality.  
 
2.2 Related Empirical Research  
Regional inequality has  been treated from two related  points of view: regional household  
income inequality as a component of overall income inequality or regional differences in labour 
productivity, measured by regional  gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.. These two 
indicators of inequality are of course closely interrelated but at the same time, they are 
fundamentally different. Regional differences of  GDP per capita  are the primary source of 
regional income inequality, whereas the latter also reflects the impact of income taxes and  of 
social security contributions and benefits. Interregional commuting will, in addition, result in a 
wedge between regional value added and household income. Therefore, cross-country studies 
on regional income disparities ought to take into account differences in  income taxation and  
social security and welfare systems (see e.g. Geppert and Stephan, 2008).  In the following 
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sections, the focus will be on the relationship between  fiscal decentralization and  regional 
inequality of GDP per capita. 
The most common  measures of regional variation  of GDP per capita, which are  used in 
empirical studies, range from the coefficient of variation, the population-weighted coefficient 
of variation and the Gini  coefficient. The choice of the spatial units covered in these studies 
depends to a large extent on the availability of detailed regional accounts:  for OECD countries 
large regions (TL2) are commonly referred to. In some studies, NUTS2 regions have been 
chosen as the unit of analysis. This choice has been criticised, i.e. by Cheshire  and Magrini 
(2000) because of the  arbitrarily   defined boundaries, although this criticism also applies to 
the TL- classification.  The proxy for fiscal decentralization varies from study to study, although 
the share of subnational expenditure in overall government expenditure has been  frequently 
used, complemented in some cases by indicators of political decentralization.  
Empirical research on the topic dealt with here can be classified into   specific country studies 
on the one hand,  and cross-country studies using panel data or  studies of a timeless,  pure 
cross-section format on the other. Rodriguez-Pose  and Ezcurra  (2009, p. 16) mention eleven 
single country studies, covering developing countries as well as  the UK and the US. In all, 
decentralisation is shown to increase regional disparities. Regional convergence has been 
shown to be positively  correlated with   decentralisation in the case of Italy (Calamai, 2009) 
and  China (Wei and Wu (2001). Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra  (2010)   conclude from a study 
of 26 high and low income  countries over the period of 1990-2005 that the impact  of the 
subnational share of expenditure on regional inequality proved to be statistically insignificant. 
In subsamples of developed and developing countries, decentralisation had a significant  
negative effect on regional disparities in high income countries in contrast to developing 
countries. Lessmann  (2012) in an extensive study, covered 56 countries at different stages of 
economic development over the period  of 1980-2009. He found that different fiscal 
decentralisation measures, referring to expenditure, revenue or tax decentralisation significantly 
affected regional inequality. However, their effect was conditioned by the level of development: 
above a threshold level of income, decentralisation contributed to a reduction of disparities in 
contrast to its impact in low income countries where a positive effect on regional inequality was 
found. These findings are in line with the results obtained by Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra 
(2010) and confirm the important role of institutional quality in the reduction of regional 
imbalances, as referred to in the preceding section. Finally, Sorens (2014) found in an empirical 
analysis of 25 OECD countries over the period of 1980-2005 that lower-income regions tend to 
catch up with higher-income regions only if the former enjoy substantial economic powers.  
 
3. DATA AND ESTIMATION  DESIGN 
3.1 Data and Variables Used 
The disparity measures applied in this paper are derived from  gross domestic product per capita 
data covering the period of 1995-2011 and are obtained for the majority of the 30 countries 
from the OECD regional statistics database. The  exceptions are data for Austria and Belgium 
(1995-1998) and Chile  (1995) which were put at our disposal by courtesy of Ch. Lessmann.  
The preferred territorial classification  is TL2, except for the geographically “small” countries 
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where TL3  is used: Belgium, Estonia, Ireland,  the Netherlands, New Zeeland, the Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia. 
Two measures of regional disparity are put forward: the coefficient of variation denoted by Rd  
and the population weighted coefficient of variation Wrd. In contrast to the (unweighted) 
coefficient of variation that is closely linked to the neoclassical approach of convergence 
(Martin and Sunley,1998, p. 221),  the population weighted coefficient of variation   takes into 
account the different population sizes of the regions  and allows for a realistic comparison of 
regions (Ezcurra  and Pascual, 2008). The two disparity  measures Rd and Wrd  have the 
advantage of their independence of the number of regions in the analysis. Moreover, they satisfy 
the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (Cowell  and Jenkins, 1995), according to which a transfer 
from a poor region to a richer one reduces inequality. Other measures of concentration such as 
the Gini coefficient adjusted for the number of regions, the  Herfindahl index and the Theil 
index  also satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle and have  been applied in the related literature. 
But as shown in Lessmann (2006, 2012), both the Herfindahl and Theil indexes are sensitive to 
the number of regions and are  therefore not adequate in cross-country studies of regional 
inequality. Both the population weighted and unweighted coefficient of variation and the 
adjusted Gini coefficient are in Lessmann’s  study  of regional inequality of 56 countries over 
the period of 1980-2009 and are  highly and positively correlated. In order to illustrate the 
landscape of regional disparities in the 30  countries considered here, the values of both 
dispersion measures Rd and Wrd,  averaged over the period of 1995-2011, figure in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1. Average disparity measures (1995-2011) and spatial units 
 
Country Rd Wrd Unit Country Rd Wrd Unit 
Australia 0.17 0.09 8TL2 Japan 0.12 0.12 10TL2 
Austria* 0.20 0.21 9TL2 Korea 0.37 0.28 16TL2 
Belgium* 0.35 0.36 11TL3 Mexico 0.46 0.62 32TL2 
Canada 0.29 0.18 13TL2 Netherlands 0.18 0.15 12TL3 
Chile* 0.47 0.35 15TL2 New Zealand 0.23 0.21 14TL3 
Czech Rep. 0.40 0.36 8TL2 Norway 0.21 0.25 7TL2 
Denmark 0.17 0.19 5TL2 Poland 0.22 0.31 16TL2 
Estonia 0.40 0.49 5TL3 Portugal 0.21 0.25 7TL2 
Finland 0.21 0.21 5TL2 Slovak Rep. 0.50 0.47 8TL3 
France 0.18 0.34 22TL2 Slovenia 0.22 0.21 12TL3 
Germany 0.30 0.21 16TL2 Spain 0.19 0.21 19TL2 
Greece 0.18 0.24 13TL2 Sweden 0.17 0.21 8TL2 
Hungary 0.36 0.43 7TL2 Switzerland 0.16 0.17 7TL2 
Ireland 0.31 0.43 8TL3 United Kingdom 0.26 0.30 12TL2 
Italy 0.25 0.27 21TL2 United States 0.37 0.17 51TL2 
Source: Own calculations from O.E.C.D. Regional Statistics except values denoted by*, obtained by 
courtesy of Ch. Lessmann (Austria, Belgium: 1995-1998; Chile: 1995). 
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Their correlation coefficient amounts to 0.75. In  vast countries such as Australia, Canada and 
the US,  the population weighted coefficient of variation is significantly smaller than its 
unweighted counterpart, since less populated regions receive smaller weights.  It is also worth 
noticing that  the average regional disparities in the six  European transition countries (Estonia, 
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) largely exceed (average  Rd= 
0.35) those in the fourteen remaining EU countries (average Rd=0.23). Regional inequality  
does not show a general trend during the period of 1995-2011,  although in the majority of the 
countries reviewed, Wrd tended to increase.  If an increase of 5 percentage points of Wrd  during 
this period marks the dividing line, spatial inequality became more pronounced in Canada, the 
Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Korea, Mexico, the Slovak Republic and 
the UK. 
In the empirical analysis presented here, the two measures of dispersion have been averaged 
over four periods (1995-2002, 2002-2005, 2005-2008 and 2008-2011) for reasons that are 
related to the  availability of data on the preferred fiscal decentralisation variable. Unlike other 
researchers on the topic, fiscal decentralisation will not be approached by the subnational 
expenditure since some of the SNG expenditure may be mandated by the central government 
and financed by transfers or shared taxes. In this way, the fiscal autonomy of the SNGs will be 
overestimated, a bias that has been recognised in related research on fiscal decentralisation ( 
Stegarescu, 2005; Ezcurra  and Pascual, 2008). A more precise and preferred indicator of 
subnational fiscal autonomy can be found in the tax autonomy  tables of  the OECD Fiscal 
Decentralization Database that are available for 1995, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011. These tables 
distinguish tax revenue for regions and local governments of 34 OECD countries  according to 
the discretionary power SNGs have on tax rates and reliefs, on rates  or on reliefs only. In this 
paper, autonomous tax revenue refers to taxes for which the SNGs   have discretionary power 
over one or more of these tax characteristics. It is denoted  by the variable Tax and  has been  
calculated as the ratio of autonomous tax income to  total consolidated or “own”   SNG revenue, 
including shared taxes, grants, user fees and property income. In the nine federal countries 
studied (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Spain, Switzerland, US)  the 
tax variable is a weighted average of the regional and local tax autonomy indicators. The 
weights are the respective revenue shares. In unitary countries, Tax  refers to the tax autonomy 
of  local governments.  In  the federal countries,  the  spatial correspondence between the 
territorial classification (TL2) and the constitutionally defined regional jurisdictions is 
acceptable, except in the  case of Belgium where, for reasons of statistical representation, 11 
TL3 spatial units are distinguished, each of them geographically smaller than the  3 
constitutional Regions. In unitary countries, the distinguished spatial units are aggregates of the 
jurisdictions of the local governments. In order to synchronize the measures of dispersion Rd 
and Wrd (averaged over each of the  four sub-periods mentioned above  with the Tax variable), 
the latter represent averages for each of the four sub periods. This procedure assumes that the 
period averages of Tax and the dispersion variables Rd and Wrd  are representative for the years 
preceding and following the mid-point of each of the four periods covered. A final remark 
concerns the number of countries, i.e. 30, retained in the empirical analysis. Four  of the 34 
OECD countries that figure in the tax autonomy tables were excluded either in view of the small 
number of regions (Iceland and Luxemburg) or because of the lack of sufficient data on regional 
GDP per capita (Israel and Turkey).  
In addition to the measures of regional dispersion and  the tax autonomy variable, 
macroeconomic variables such as real  national GDP per capita   and  the business cycle 
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indicator Gap are obtained from OECD data and averaged over the four periods mentioned. 
Preference is given  here to the output gap as a  straightforward  business cycle indicator over 
nationwide  unemployment rates that react with time lags to changes in output. In addition to 
regional and local fiscal autonomy, the structure of SNG expenditure may turn out to be relevant 
in the explanation of regional disparities. In this respect, expenditure on education and 
infrastructure projects may be instrumental in boosting the competitive position of the SNGs, 
resulting in a reduction of regional disparities. The IMF Government Finance Statistics contain 
a functional classification of  subnational expenditure (the COFOG files) over the period of 
2000-2009 for most of the countries in the analysis, except for Canada, Chile and Mexico. For 
Germany, Korea and Japan data are only available for some years of the period considered here. 
In addition to the  microeconomic data discussed above, other  nationwide variables may also 
contribute to the explanation of regional disparities. In the first place, transport infrastructure 
investment significantly affects regional development (OECD, 2002). The relevant variable 
used  in this framework is total expenditure on inland transport investment and maintenance, 
expressed as a percentage of GPD and denoted by Inv.  The OECD   database contains  
information on Inv for the period 1995-2011 for all 30 countries under review. Although no 
information is provided on the financing of these outlays (SNGs, central government, public or 
private) nor on the regional allocation of Inv, it may be assumed that infrastructure investment 
generates positive externalities for some or all regions and therefore contributes in this way  to 
a reduction of regional inequality (Kelejian and  Robinson, 1997). Second,  all countries 
considered here have been exposed during the estimation period to  increasing economic 
globalisation that, according to Giannetti (2002) and Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2006),  
adversely affects regional inequality both on theoretical and empirical grounds. In order to test 
for the impact of international trade  on regional disparities, the macroeconomic  openness to 
trade  has been approached through the variable Open, i.e. the ratio of the sum of exports and 
imports to GDP, which has been obtained from national statistics from The World Bank.  
Time-invariant data on cultural, ethnic or religious heterogeneity and on the spatial 
agglomeration of economic activities will  also figure in the empirical analysis. Alesina  et al. 
(2002) showed that  ethnic fragmentation has a particularly  negative impact on economic 
growth and is moreover negatively correlated with GDP per capita. The variable Frag  denotes  
the ethnic fragmentation index for each of the 30 countries studied and  is obtained from 
Alesina’s 2002 paper. As for potential agglomeration effects on regional disparities,  preference 
is given to the index (b)  suggested by Uchida and Nelson (2008). This index takes into account, 
not only  population density, but also  the mobility of the  urban population through 
transportation networks. It is denoted    by Aggl.  
The quality of subnational governments has been shown, among others, by Kyriacou et al.  
(2015) mentioned above, to be influential in the explanation  of regional inequality. These 
authors rely on the Country Risk Guide in order to assess political, economic and financial risk 
among countries. Since this data source is not publicly accessible,  country information on 
government quality was obtained from the World Bank Governance Data (Kaufmann et al., 
2009), despite  the critique on these data, e.g. by Thomas (2010). More specifically, the 
government effectiveness index, averaged over the period of 1996-2011, is considered to be 
relevant in  the empirical  analysis; it will be  denoted by Gefav. This index  does not explicitly 
refer to sub-national governments; it reflects the perception of the effectiveness of government 
policies in general  for the country as a whole. 
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Finally other structural features of the economies considered here are potential candidates in 
the explanation of regional inequality: the size of their central government, their federal or 
unitary status and the importance of transfers in SNG revenue. The size of the central 
government (Cgov), measured by its share in total government expenditure, matters on prior 
grounds since it reflects its  redistributive capacity  aiming at mitigating regional inequalities 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). The share of transfers received from other governments 
in total regional revenue (Transf), mirrors the transfer dependency of the regions that, contrary 
to fiscal autonomy, is not expected to contribute to strengthening the economic  tissue of the  
local economy (Kessler and Lessmann, 2010). The dummy variable Fed  represents  the federal 
structure of the country and can be conceived as a catch-all of all potentially favourable effects 
on regional inequality of political and economic decentralisation. The sample of 30 countries 
contains 9 federations: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Spain, 
Switzerland and the United States. The 21 unitary countries studied are: Chile, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
3.2 Model Specification 
The institutional and cultural diversity of the 30 OECD countries  studied  in this paper suggests 
a fixed effect framework for the panel data  analysis of  regional disparities. The particular  
nature of the data i.e.  4 sub-periods of the 1995-2011 time span results in 120 observations of 
each time-varying variable included in the basic specification. The small number of points in 
time, in  comparison with the spatial dimension, implies that the parameter estimates will  
predominantly reflect cross-section effects of the explanatory variables and to a lesser degree 
their  dynamic impact.  
The basic empirical specification has the following form: 
Disparityit  = α + β1.Taxit + β2. Invit + β3.Tax x Invit + β4. LogGDPit + β5. Openit + β6. Gapit + γ1. 
Fragi + γ2. Aggli + γ3. Gefavi + γ4. Cgovi + γ5. Transfi + γ6. Fedi +τi +μit   
             (i=1,2,3,…30 ; t = 1,2,3,4)                                                                  (1)                                                                                                                                                                          
where Disparityit  = Rdit  , Wrdit ; i and t denote the i-th country and time, respectively. The 
fixed cross-section effect is represented by τ and μ is the time- and country-specific error term.  
The impact of tax autonomy on regional disparities, in the absence  of infrastructure investment, 
is reflected by β1 which is assumed to be strictly negative. The same holds for the independent 
effect of infrastructure investment: β2<0.    The appearance of the interaction variable Tax x Inv 
requires further explanation. Since fiscal autonomy fosters the accountability of the regional 
government towards its electorate, it is clear  that SNGs will pursue expenditure and tax policies  
with  benefits that are maximally internalised in their own jurisdiction.  On the other hand, 
infrastructure investment, albeit it financed by regions or by the central government, typically 
generates positive externalities for all or some regions and has the characteristics of a public 
good  (Kelejian and  Robinson, 1997). If e.g. infrastructure development improves the 
accessibility of poorer regions and interregional mobility of goods and labour, it certainly 
contributes to the reduction of regional inequality (for the case of Latin America, see e.g. 
Calderon and Servén, 2010). The  positive effect of tax autonomy, if any, on regional disparities, 
can therefore be complemented by infrastructure investment. Alternatively, infrastructure 
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investment can be a substitute for  a low degree of tax autonomy and it supports   regions in 
their development that are to a large extent  dependent on shared taxes and transfers. To the 
extent that β1 , β2<0,  β3 will be strictly positive. The parameter β3 represents the impact of tax 
autonomy on regional inequality. It is  conditional on the effect of infrastructure investment or 
alternatively, the infrastructure investment effect on disparities conditional on the fiscal 
autonomy of the regions.  
The regional inequality impact of the  level of development, is  represented by β4 , the parameter  
of LogGDP.  Vast literature exists on the link between development and spatial inequality, 
surveyed e.g. by Lessmann (2011). He finds evidence of an inverted-U relationship between 
regional inequality and the level of GDP per capita and of an increase of spatial inequality in 
late stages of economic development. Since the majority of the 30 OECD countries studied here 
can be classified as high income economies,  a positive sign of β4 can reasonably be expected. 
In the line with the findings of Gannetti (2002) and Rodriguez-Pose  and Gill (2006),  the impact 
of international trade on regional disparities is assumed positive, i.e. resulting in regional 
divergence, implying β5>0. The empirical research on the impact of the aggregate business 
cycle on regional convergence is rather scarce and focusses primarily on income disparities. 
Magrini  et al. ( 2013) concluded in their study of 48 States of the US over the period of 1989-
2007 that the aggregate business cycle exerted pro-cyclical effects on regional income 
divergence. They argued that this effect resulted from the divergent   pattern of regional 
specialization whereby regions specialised in innovative activities benefit most from an 
economic upswing in contrast to regions characterised by traditional industries. The corollary 
of this argument is that if regions  are not significantly different with respect to their economic 
specialisation and competitiveness, the aggregate business cycle will not distort the existing 
disparities in GDP per capita. Therefore, no prior assumption can be made about the sign of β6.. 
The arguments developed in the preceding section suggest that fragmentation adversely affects 
regional disparities (γ1 >0),  contrary  to  the effect of the  size of the central government (γ4 
<0)  and of  the effectiveness of government policies in general (γ3 <0. The theoretical 
arguments for including measures of spatial agglomeration in the explanation of regional 
disparities are reviewed e.g. by Gardiner et al.(2010). They draw on the “new economic 
geography” models that, on the one hand,  predict  that under certain assumptions about 
competition on the markets for goods and the production technology and factor mobility, spatial 
agglomeration of economic activities will result, implying larger disparities. On the other hand, 
spatial transaction costs will encourage the dispersion of firms and workers, favouring 
convergence. This family of models balances concentration and  dispersion forces, whereby 
agglomeration tendencies tend to dominate and consequently, regional disparities will 
ultimately increase. However, the tendency for increased spatial concentration may engender 
congestion effects and negative externalities resulting in a dispersion of economic activities and 
a reduction of regional inequality. The unclear predictions of the “new economic geography” 
with respect to regional disparities are confirmed in the empirical findings of Gardiner et al. for  
15 EU member countries over the period of 1981-2007. The mixed empirical results of the link 
between agglomeration and regional inequality suggest that the sign of γ2 cannot be defined on 
prior grounds. As for the impact on regional disparities of Trans,  the share of transfers in SNG 
revenue, the opposite sign of the tax variable will be reasonably expected:  γ5>0 (Kessler and 
Lessmann, 2010). Finally, as for the sign of the federal dummy variable, Fed,  the related  
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empirical studies reviewed in the preceding section suggest that decentralisation may affect 
regional inequality in a positive or negative way, leaving the  sign of γ6  undetermined. 
The third research question stated in the introduction of this paper referred to the potential 
impact of sub-national expenditure categories, such as education and economic affairs on 
regional inequality, at given levels of tax autonomy. Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010) 
included- in addition to education and economic affairs-  expenditure on health and social 
protection, arguing that these  public provisions could make a difference with respect to regional 
disparities in their sample of developing and developed countries.  The functional classification 
of sub-national government expenditure in the IMF Government Finance Statistics does not 
include data for Canada, Chile and Mexico. Data on subnational expenditure on education 
(Educ) and economic affairs (Econ) over the period of 2000-2009 could be obtained from this 
source for the other 27 countries, although only for some years for Germany, Korea and Japan. 
For the other countries the  time-invariant variables Educ and Econ represent period averages 
of their respective expenditure shares.  
The alternative specification of  equation (1), including the regional expenditure shares on 
education and economic affairs is: 
Disparityit  = α + β1.Taxit + β2. Invit + β3.Tax x Invit + β4. LogGDPit + β5. Openit + β6. Gapit + γ1. 
Fragi + γ2. Aggli + γ3. Gefavi + γ4. Cgovi + γ5. Transfi  + γ6. Fedi +   γ7 . Educi  + γ8 .Econi  +τi 
+μit     
(i=1,2,…27; t=1,2,3,4)                                                  (2) 
If poorer regions succeed in reducing the gap with the  richer ones in spending relatively more 
on education and economic affairs, the expected sign of these variables in (2) is strictly negative. 
However, a potential  endogeneity  problem arises with respect to these variables since 
education and economic affairs typically are income-elastic social goods resulting in higher 
expenditure shares as income increases. As a consequence, no prior assumptions can be made 
regarding the sign of γ7 and γ8.  
3.3 Estimation Method 
The  wide variety of the institutional and cultural characteristics of the countries under review 
presumably add, in addition to the variables included in the specification of equations (1) and 
(2), to the explanation of the observed  regional disparities and suggest  therefore a fixed-effects 
panel data estimation method. The cross-section fixed-effects   refer to the time-invariant 
variables above and to the stochastic error term τi.  A fixed-effects estimation of the model, 
assuming it is relevant, does not allow, however, for the identification of the parameters of the 
time-invariant variables. In order to overcome this problem Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
suggested a two-step estimation procedure, whereby in the first step  the fixed-effects model is 
estimated without the time-invariant variables. In the second step, the fixed-effects vector  
estimated in the preceding step is decomposed into estimates of the parameters of the time-
invariant variables  and  error terms using instrumental variables (IV). A pragmatic solution to 
the choice of the appropriate instruments has been suggested by Chatelain and Ralf (2010). 
These authors  use simple t-statistic tests instead of the prior assumptions about the correlations 
between the candidate IV-variables  and the time-invariant variables as in Hausman and Taylor 
(1981) and commented upon by Greene (2012, 435-436). This solution is applied in this paper 
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to the generalized least squares heteroscedastic robust estimation of equations (1)  and (2). 
Previously, the Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) was applied  and implied a 
rejection of a random-effects model in favour of a fixed-effects approach. 
The estimation results of the equations (1) and (2) could, in principle,  suffer from an 
endogeneity bias resulting from the treatment of the tax autonomy variable (Tax) and the time-
invariant transfer share (Transf) as exogenous to  regional disparity. It is indeed conceivable  
that  substantial regional inequalities trigger  a process of devolution, initiated by the political 
pressure of the poorer or richer regions or both  on the  central government. Devolution in 
Belgium, which  started as early in 1970 with the decentralisation of cultural affairs, may be 
illustrative in this respect. Modest steps in the direction of fiscal decentralisation were made in 
1980 and in 2001, although the regions used their fiscal autonomy to some extent only in the 
second decade of this century. This example shows that the constitutional transfer of fiscal 
competences from the central government to the regions and the effective use of their tax 
autonomy by the latter, may take considerable time. Since the panel data used here cover only 
16 years, divided into 4 time periods, the potential dynamic interaction of regional inequality 
and fiscal decentralisation may be under-exposed in favour  of the timeless cross-section effects 
of tax autonomy on regional disparities. This argument also holds for transfers,  that are roughly 
considered  here as complements to autonomous taxes  from the central government to the 
regions (1). The potential endogeneity bias in the model could be remedied in a pragmatic way 
by substituting lagged values for the tax autonomy and transfer variables. However, through  
this approach the degrees of freedom, that are already limited in view of the small number of 
time periods in the data set, would subsequently be further reduced.  
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Results for 30 OECD Countries 
The estimation results of equation (1) are reported in Table 2. The first panel of the table 
contains the parameter estimates of equation (1) without the interaction variable Tax x Inv  that 
figures in the second panel. Taken separately, the parameter estimates of the tax and investment 
variable, are  statistically insignificant, indicating that regional disparities are insensitive to 
fiscal decentralisation and infrastructure investment both operating as independent policy 
instruments in dealing with spatial inequality. The insignificant role of fiscal decentralisation 
in coping with regional disparities can be explained by the fact that poorer regions face a 
substantially smaller tax base in comparison with richer SNGs. Tax cuts initiated by the former 
in order to attract firms and to stimulate net inflows of tax paying households would severely 
deteriorate the SNG fiscal stance in the medium term, thus  rendering this policy strategy 
unattractive. Rodriguez-Pose  and Ezcurra (2010) found that fiscal decentralisation favoured 
regional convergence only in OECD and EU  high income countries and resulted in spatial 
inequality in developing countries.  The negative but insignificant impact of Tax on Rd and Wrd 
could be ascribed to the characteristics of the sample of 30 OECD countries, among which are 
relatively  low income countries such as Mexico, Chile and the European transit economies, 
along with richer economies. 
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Table 2. Impact of tax autonomy and infrastructure investment on regional disparities 
 
 No interaction Interaction model 
Dep. Variable Rd Wrd Rd Wrd 
Tax -0.0007 
(1.4171) 
-0.0007 
(1.0735) 
-0.0030*** 
(3.8567) 
-0.0025** 
(2.088) 
Inv 0.0050 
(0.5623) 
-0.0195 
(1.1815) 
-0.0389*** 
(2.6807) 
-0.0522** 
(2.0164) 
Tax x Inv   0.0024*** 
(3.8567) 
0.0018 
(1.6300) 
Log GDP 0.2266** 
(2.4308) 
0.2648** 
(2.2750) 
0.1820*** 
(2.8479) 
0.2316** 
(2.1749) 
Open 0.0001 
(0.1328) 
0.0003 
(0.3523) 
0.0003 
(0.6069) 
0.0004 
(0.0545) 
Gap -0.0026* 
(1.9077) 
-0.0009 
(0.4269) 
-0.0022** 
(2.2147) 
-0.0006 
(0.3208) 
Constant -0.0419 
(0.4577) 
-0.0809 
(0.7294) 
0.0497 
(0.7844) 
-0.0127 
(0.1280) 
R2 0.9700 0.9489 0.9756 0.9512 
Adjusted R2 0.9579 0.9285 0.9655 0.9309 
Instrumental variables estimation 
Frag 0.1876 
(1.4635) 
0.2485* 
(1.9139) 
0.1876* 
(1.7388) 
0.2359* 
(1.9009) 
Aggl -0.0009 
(0.7824) 
-0.0018 
(1.4973) 
-0.0009 
(0.7891) 
-0.0017 
(1.5217) 
Gefav -0.1261*** 
(3.7398) 
-0.1609*** 
(4.7116) 
-0.1261*** 
(3.8337) 
-0.1504*** 
(4.6073) 
Cgov -0.0048* 
(1.8265) 
-0.0031 
(1.1923) 
-0.0048* 
(1.7507) 
-0.0029 
(1.1601) 
Transf -0.0008 
(0.7558) 
0.0011 
(1.0474) 
-0.0008 
(0.7998) 
0.0008 
(0.7799) 
Fed -0.0497 
(0.9100) 
-0.0827 
(1.4944) 
-0.0497 
(1.0947) 
-0.0839 
(1.5866) 
 Number of observations: 120 
 Number of cross-sections: 30 
Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses: *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
 
 
Table 2 also reveals, in line with the findings of e.g. Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010), 
Lessmann (2011) and Ezcurra and Pascual (2008)  that regional  disparities tend to increase at 
higher levels of GDP per capita. Contrary to the findings of Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2006), 
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the effects of trade  on regional disparities, represented by the variable Open, apparently could 
not be demonstrated with the data set used here. The business cycle clearly affects spatial 
convergence favourably since the parameter of the variable Gap is significantly negative, at 
least in explaining disparities measured by the unweighted coefficient of variation Rd. This 
means that an upswing of the business cycle, reflected by a positive (overall) output gap, 
contributes to regional convergence. This finding implies that the  most competitive regions 
will during this phase  exert a positive pull effect on the poorer regions. The latter benefit during 
the later years of economic expansion from cheaper labour, less congestion and spare  
production capacity in contrast to the more developed regions that, in general, are more  services 
oriented and less sensitive to a cyclical upswing. The absence of a significant impact of Gap on 
the weighted coefficient of variation Wrd needs further explanation. If the poorer regions catch 
up with the richer ones during a cyclical boom period and if it is assumed that the latter are 
more populated than the former, the weighted coefficient of variation will not fully mirror the 
ongoing spatial convergence in contrast to its unweighted counterpart. It may also  be noted 
that the output gap variable is actually widely used in the study of business cycle effects, 
whereas unemployment statistics measure the derived and delayed  effect of economic activity 
and are therefore less appropriate in spatial convergence studies. 
The instrumental variable estimation reveals the significant contribution of the efficiency of 
governments (Gefav) to regional convergence, measured by Rd or Wrd. Cultural fragmentation 
leads, as was expected, to spatial inequality, measured by Wrd. The potential spatially 
equalising capacity of the central government,  is confirmed by the significant negative sign of 
the parameter of Cgov when Rd is the relevant measure of regional disparities. 
The estimation results of the interaction model confirm the convergence effect of tax autonomy. 
The coefficients of  the Tax variable  are now significantly negative. They imply that an increase 
of  1 percentage point of  the revenue share of autonomous taxes, in the absence of infrastructure 
investment, contributes to regional convergence by only 0.003 percentage points. To state this 
impact differently: the SNG revenue share of autonomous taxes has to increase by 10 
percentage points in order to result in a decrease of the coefficient of variation of GDP per 
capita by 0.03 percentage points   (by .02 percentage points if Wrd applies) for regions that do 
not benefit from infrastructure investment. The convergence impact of infrastructure 
investment  is more substantial: if its share in GDP is raised by 1 percentage point, 
independently of a change in autonomous taxes, the disparity measures decline  by 0.04 to 0.05 
percentage points respectively. 
The marginal contribution to regional convergence, measured by Rd,  of infrastructure 
investment-  conditional on the degree of tax autonomy-  can be derived  as: - 0.039 +0.002 
Tax, which is negative if the share of autonomous taxes is smaller than 19.5 percent. This  cut-
off value is substantially lower than the sample average of 26.6 percent. This condition holds 
for 12 of the 30 countries, among these are European transit economies such as Estonia, Poland 
and Slovenia and   low income countries Chile and Mexico. Analogously, the conditional 
marginal impact of Inv when convergence is measured by the weighted coefficient of variation 
Wrd amounts to: - 0.052 + 0.002 Tax, implying a favourable effect of infrastructure investment 
on regional disparities if the revenue share of autonomous taxes is smaller than 26 percent. This  
cut-off value roughly corresponds to the sample average. The standard error of the interaction 
term  at this cut-off point  is 0.05 and decreases substantially at lower values of Tax (Brambor 
et al., 2006).  
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In the same way the marginal, conditional contribution to spatial convergence of tax autonomy 
is derived from the parameter estimates of Tax and Tax x Inv : -0.003 + 0.002 Inv when Rd  
figures as a disparity measure. The marginal impact of Tax implies that an increase of SNG tax 
autonomy favourably affects regional convergence as long as the investment share in GDP is 
smaller than 1.5 percent of GDP. This cut-off value applies to  21 of the 30 countries of the 
sample, among which are 19 of the 23 European countries that display a below-average 
investment rate. The overall sample  average of Inv amounts to 0.97 per cent and implies a 
standard error of the interaction term of 0.001 that decreases at values of Inv  smaller than 0.97 
per cent. The  marginal contribution of autonomous taxes to  regional disparities, when  
reflected by Wrd  and conditional on infrastructure investment, is (except  for rounding errors) 
identical to the case where Rd is taken as the representative inequality measure. 
Apparently, transport infrastructure investment positively contributes to regional convergence, 
particularly if the  tax autonomy of the SNGs is relatively modest. This fiscal characteristic  of 
the SNGs may impede substantial  investment  in socially profitable infrastructure  projects. 
Below average fiscal autonomy and infrastructure investment rates are found in the  federal 
countries Belgium, Germany and Mexico and in Estonia, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK. 
In order to further regional convergence in the aforementioned federations, strengthening the 
subnational fiscal  autonomy may allow the regions to embark on productive  infrastructure 
investment projects. This constraint also  holds for the SNGs of the four previously mentioned 
unitary countries. The fact that the infrastructure rate in these European countries is below 
average may reflect the presence of a substantial capital stock of transportation infrastructure 
that embodies past investment. In countries where the subnational fiscal autonomy substantially 
exceeds the sample average in contrast to the below sample average infrastructure investment 
rate, such as in  Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the US, the social profitability constraint on 
new investment projects is, of course,  a decisive criterion if the promotion of spatial equality 
is a major policy objective.  
The other parameter estimates  of the interaction model confirm the results of  the model without 
interaction: welfare, reflected by GDP per capita, increases regional inequality and regional 
disparities, measured by Rd  tend to diminish in cyclical boom periods. The decomposition of 
the  country fixed effects indicate  that more fragmented countries show more regional 
divergence and that government effectiveness promotes convergence. Countries where the 
expenditure share of the central government is important, can apparently better  cope with 
spatial divergence in comparison with more decentralised nations. Federally organised 
countries show less divergence in comparison to unitary nations,  judging from the negative 
sign of Fed with respect to  the weighted coefficient of variation, although the statistical 
significance of the corresponding   parameter estimate is  somewhat smaller than 10 percent. 
Finally, transfer dependency of subnational governments and agglomeration economies do not 
significantly impact regional disparities. 
4.2 The  Effect of Subnational  Expenditure Items on Convergence in 27 OECD Countries.  
Table 3 presents the estimation results of equation (2) for 27 OECD countries for which data 
on the functional classification of subnational expenditures is available. In particular,  the  
impact on convergence by expenditure on education and  economic affairs is the primary focus. 
The exclusion of Canada, Chile and Mexico for which data on these subnational expenditures 
is missing, can also be conceived as a robustness test of the results obtained in Table 2, although  
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the significance of the estimates in Table 3 may  be affected by the reduced number of degrees 
of freedom.                            
The most significant parameter estimates that are similar to the results of the first half of Table 
2 are obtained in the explanation of the unweighted coefficient of variation Rd. The parameter 
estimates of Tax, Inv, Tax x Inv , Log GDP and Gap with respect to Rd all lie within a 95 percent 
confidence interval of the estimates in Table 2. This characteristic also holds for the parameter 
estimates of the same variables with respect to Wrd, although their statistical significance has 
decreased. The instrumental variables estimation with respect to Wrd  confirm the negative 
influence on convergence of cultural fragmentation,  in contrast to the positive  impact on  
convergence of government effectiveness. 
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Table 3. Impact of tax autonomy, infrastructure investment and regional expenditure on 
disparities 
 
Dep. Variable Rd Wrd 
Tax -0.0021*** 
(3.2760) 
-0.0019 
(1.3135) 
Inv -0.0281** 
(2.0223) 
-0.0493* 
(1.7072) 
Tax x Inv 0.0017*** 
(3.1561) 
0.0014 
(1.0694) 
Log GDP 0.1326** 
(2.1733) 
0.1904 
(1.5333) 
Open 0.0006 
(1.4901) 
0.0007 
(0.7710) 
Gap -0.0019* 
(1.6929) 
0.0001 
(0.0474) 
Constant 0.0580 
(0.9374) 
0.0022 
(0.0201) 
R2 0.9719 0.9307 
Adjusted R2 0.9598 0.9009 
Instrumental variables estimation 
Frag 0.0889 
(0.5433) 
0.1837** 
(2.0315) 
Aggl -0.0005 
(0.3287) 
-0.0010 
(0.9692) 
Gefav -0.0484 
(1.1565) 
-0.0807** 
(2.4078) 
Cgov 0.0011 
(0.2267) 
0.0013 
(0.5004) 
Transf -0.0008 
(0.8865) 
0.0005 
(0.5561) 
Fed -0.0289 
(0.6162) 
-0.0906** 
(2.0990) 
Econ 0.0028 
(0.6021) 
0.0008 
(0.3154) 
Educ 0.0044 
(0.9031) 
0.0014 
(0.6889) 
 Number of observations: 104 
 Number of cross-sections: 26 
Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses: *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively.  
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A federal structure significantly contributes to a decrease of the weighted coefficient of 
variation. Finally, no significant  convergence impact of subnational expenditure on education 
and on economic affairs could be found. This is in line with Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra 
(2010), who  concluded that not only subnational expenditure on education and  economic 
affairs, but also spending on health and housing were completely dissociated from regional 
disparities, at least in developed countries similar to those in the sample of 26 OECD countries 
studied in this paper. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper analyses the link between fiscal decentralisation, infrastructure investment and  
regional disparities in 30 OECD countries  over the period of 1995-2011. According to the 
“second generation fiscal federalism”, fiscal decentralisation will induce  the subnational 
governments of poorer regions to compete with their richer counterparts, thus narrowing 
regional income differences. Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010) question this optimistic view 
and stress the conditional role of the economic environment in which fiscal decentralisation 
operates, this is in developing economies  less favourable to the potential  equalising impact of 
fiscal decentralisation.  
In order to empirically test for the equalising effect of fiscal decentralisation, subnational tax 
autonomy, drawn from the OECD classification of subnational tax revenue, is introduced as a 
key explanatory variable of regional disparities, measured by the coefficient of variation and 
by its weighted counterpart.  Transport infrastructure investment, viewed  as a complement or 
a substitute for subnational tax autonomy in the framework of regional inequality, is introduced 
as an additional explanatory  variable. Whereas tax autonomy refers to the virtues of the  
competition between SNGs,  transport infrastructure investment generates positive externalities 
for some or all regions irrespective of the financing government, and it shares many 
characteristics with social goods. 
A fixed-effects  panel data estimation of the basic equation for  30 OECD countries over 4 time 
periods, with regional disparities  as  dependent variable, reveals that SNG tax autonomy 
significantly  contributes to regional convergence although its impact remains modest relative 
to the  effect of transport infrastructure investment. Furthermore,  the interaction model shows 
that the convergence impact of transport infrastructure investment  strengthens  as  subnational 
fiscal autonomy weakens. In this respect, below average subnational  fiscal autonomy and  
transport infrastructure rates are found in the federal countries Belgium, Germany and Mexico 
and in the unitary countries Estonia, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK. In order to foster 
regional convergence in the three federations, strengthening subnational fiscal autonomy may 
allow their regions to embark on socially profitable investment projects. As for the four 
mentioned unitary countries, only Estonia and Ireland show above average regional disparities 
and extremely low subnational i.e. local  fiscal autonomy. These  characteristics suggest,  on 
the basis of the parameter estimates of the model, a substantial  increase of local fiscal autonomy 
in order to mitigate spatial inequality. The empirical findings also reveal cyclical variations of 
regional disparities that are weakened during economic boom periods. Furthermore, in the line 
of findings in other empirical studies of the subject, cultural fragmentation intensifies spatial  
inequality in contrast to the convergence impact of government effectiveness.  The empirical 
results of the estimation of the basic equation for 27 OECD countries confirm the findings for 
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the set of 30 countries, but could not detect an impact on regional disparities of  subnational 
expenditures on education and economic affairs. 
Further research on the topic would certainly benefit from detailed data on the financing of 
infrastructure investment in general, whether by SNGS, by the central government or by both. 
 
 
NOTES 
1. In addition to autonomous tax revenue and transfers from other governments, taxes   
shared with the central government, property income and user fees are the main components 
of subnational government revenue.  
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Appendix table 1. Descriptive statistics of key variables 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Rd 0.269 0.105 0.110 0.530 
Wrd 0.275 0.123 0.070 0.640** 
Tax 26.594 17.727 0.000* 64.300 
Inv 0.973 0.432 0.300 2.200 
Log GDP 1.399 0.202 0.815 1.767 
Gap 0.146 1.898 -4.700 7.200 
Open 81.817 36.338 20.000 165.000 
 *: Ireland (1995-2011) 
 **: Mexico (2005-2011) 
 
 
Appendix table 2. Correlation matrix of time-varying variables 
 
 Rd Wrd Tax Inv Log GDP Gap Open 
Rd 1.000       
Wrd 0.753 1.000      
Tax -0.162 -0.360 1.000     
Inv -0.011 -0.135 -0.042 1.000    
Log GDP -0.587 -0.626 0.412 -0.156 1.000   
Gap 0.038 0.091 -0.036 0.009 0.096 1.000  
Open 0.340 0.436 -0.178 -0.028 -0.135 0.188 1.000 
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Appendix table 3. Definition and source of variables 
 
Variable Definition Date  Source 
(a) Time – varying variables 
Rd Coefficient of variation of regional GDP per capita; 5-year averages 
(1995-2011) 
OECD Regional database 
Wrd Population-weighted coefficient of variation of GDP per capita; 5-year 
averages (1995-2011) 
OECD Regional database 
Tax Share of autonomous taxes in consolidated own revenue of state and 
local governments (averages 1995-02, 02-05, 05-08, 08-11) 
OECD Fiscal decentralization database – Table 1. 
(1) (2) 
Inv Ratio of transport infrastructure investment and maintenance spending to 
GDP (5-year averages 1995-2012) 
OECD Infrastructure investment database 
GDP Real GDP per head (5-year averages 1995-2011 OECD Regional database – Regional accounts 
Gap Annual output gap: 5-year averages 1995-2011 OECD Economic outlook 
Open Exports of goods and services (%GDP); 5-year averages 1995-2011) The World Bank  
(b) Time – invariant variables 
Frag Index of ethnic fragmentation (variable years 1983-01) Alesina et al. (2002) 
Aggl Measure of urban concentration – agglomeration index (b) – year 2000 Uchida et al. (2008) 
Gefav Index of government effectiveness – average 1996-2011 The World Bank 
Cgov Share of central government expenditure in total government 
expenditure – 2003 data 
OECD Economic outlook 
Transf Share of subnational transfer revenue in total subnational revenue. 
Average 1995-2011 
OECD Decentralization database 
Fed Federal dummy variable  
(1) For federal countries Tax is a weighted average of the regional and local tax autonomy indicator (the weights are the respective revenue 
shares). 
(2) For Australia, Chile and Japan: tax and total subnational revenue were obtained from the IMF Government Finance Statistics, the OECD 
Fiscal Decentralization Database and from the respective National Statistics Offices. 
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